INTRODUCTION
There is only one country in which euthanasia is officially condoned and widely practiced: the Netherlands. Although euthanasia is proscribed by the Dutch Penal Code, the Dutch Supreme Court held in 1984 that a doctor who kills a patient may in certain circumstances successfully invoke the defense of necessity, also contained in the Code, to justify the killing. In the same year, the Royal Dutch Medical Association (K.N.M.G.) issued its members guidelines for euthanasia. Since that time the lives of thousands of Dutch patients have been intentionally shortened by their doctors.
Both the legal and medical guidelines include a central requirement that the patient make a free and explicit request. Defenders of the guidelines have claimed that the guidelines permit voluntary euthanasia but not euthanasia without request. They also claim that the guidelines are sufficiently strict and precise to prevent any slide down a "slippery slope" to euthanasia without request, and that there has been no evidence of any such slide in the Netherlands.
The question addressed in this paper can be simply put: does the Dutch experience of euthanasia lend any support to the claims of supporters of voluntary euthanasia that acceptance of voluntary euthanasia does not lead to acceptance of non-voluntary euthanasia, or does it tend to support the claims of opponents of voluntary euthanasia that it leads down a "slippery slope" to euthanasia without request?
The "slippery slope" argument is often thought of as one argument but it is more accurately understood as comprising two independent yet related forms: the "logical" and the "empirical." In its logical form, the argument runs that acceptance of voluntary euthanasia leads to acceptance of at least non-voluntary euthanasia (that is, the killing of patients incapable of requesting euthanasia such as newborns or those with advanced senile dementia). Arguments for voluntary euthanasia rest on the judgment that some lives are not "worth" living. Doctors are not automata who simply execute their patients' wishes, however autonomous. They are professionals who form their own judgment about the merits of any request for medical intervention. A responsible doctor would no more euthanatize a patient just because the patient autonomously asked for it any more than the doctor would prescribe anti-depressant drugs for a patient just because the patient autonomously requested them. The doctor, if acting professionally, would decide in each case whether the intervention was truly in the patient's best interests. Consequently, the alleged justification of voluntary euthanasia rests fundamentally not on the patient's autonomous request but on the doctor's judgment that the request is justified because the patient no longer has a life "worth" living. If a doctor can make this judgment in relation to an autonomous patient, he can, logically, make it in relation to an incompetent patient. Moreover, if death is a "benefit" for competent patients suffering certain conditions, why should it be denied incompetent patients suffering from the same conditions?
In its "empirical" form, the "slippery slope" argument asserts that even if a line can in principle be drawn between voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, a slide will occur in practice because the safeguards to prevent it cannot be made effective. A common illustration of the argument in this form is the experience of legalized abortion in England, where the law allowing therapeutic abortion has conspicuously failed to prevent widespread abortion for social reasons. ' The empirical argument is, of course, dependent on empirical evidence. Invaluable evidence about euthanasia in the Netherlands has of late been provided by a large-scale survey carried out on behalf of a Commission appointed by the Dutch Government to investigate medical decision-making in the Netherlands at the end of life. This article makes comprehensive use of this evidence.
The paper comprises three parts. Part I outlines both the relevant law as laid down by the Dutch Supreme Court and the guidelines for euthanasia prescribed by the K.N.M.G., and con-siders their alleged precision and strictness. Part II summarizes the evidence, including that contained in the above survey, which indicates widespread breach of those guidelines (especially the practice of euthanasia without request). Part III examines the slide from voluntary to non-voluntary euthanasia in Dutch practice and the shift in Dutch opinion towards condonation of non-voluntary euthanasia. The paper concludes that there is ample evidence from the Dutch experience to substantiate the relevance of the "slippery slope" argument in both its forms.
First, an important word about terminology. A standard definition of "euthanasia" is "lt] he intentional putting to death of a person with an incurable or painful disease." 2 It is common to refer to euthanasia carried out by an act as "active" euthanasia and euthanasia by omission as "passive" euthanasia. Common definitions further distinguish between "voluntary," "non-voluntary," and "involuntary" euthanasia, which refer, respectively, to euthanasia where the patient requests it, where the patient is incompetent, and where the patient is competent but has made no request.
Dutch definitions of "euthanasia" are, typically, markedly narrower, such as "the purposeful acting to terminate life by someone other than the person concerned upon request of the latter." 3 It will be apparent that this is narrower than the usual definition in two respects: it is limited to cases of active 4 killing, and there must be a request by the patient. In short, the Dutch definition corresponds to what is normally called "active, voluntary euthanasia."
I. STRICT SAFEGUARDS?

A. The Legal and Professional Guidelines
Taking the life of another person at his request is an offense contrary to Article 293 of the Penal Code (as amended in 1891), and assisting suicide is prohibited by Article 294. In 1984, however, in the Alkmaar case, the Dutch Supreme Court allowed a doctor's appeal against conviction for intentionally killing one of his elderly patients at her request. The Court held that the lower courts had wrongly failed to consider whether he had been faced with a "conflict of duties" 5 (his duty to obey Article 293 on the one hand and his duty to relieve his patient's suffering on the other), whether "according to responsible medical Opinion " 6 measured by the "prevailing standards of medical ethics" a situation of "necessity" existed, and whether he had, therefore, been entitled to the defense of necessity, contained in Article 40. ' This decision is remarkable for a number of reasons. First, the necessity defense has traditionally been understood asjustifying an ostensible breach of the law in order to save life (as by pushing someone out of the path of an oncoming car), not to take it. Second, the judgment fails to explain why the doctor's duty to alleviate suffering overrides his duty not to kill. Finally, the Court appears to abdicate the power to determine the circumstances in which killing attracts the necessity defense to medical opinion.
In a series of decisions following this landmark case, lower courts have laid down a number of conditions which have hitherto been understood as being required for a doctor to avail himself of the necessity defense, though there is increasing uncertainty as to which, if any, are required. Subject to this important caveat, these conditions were listed in 1989 by Mrs. Borst-Eilers, then Chairman of the Dutch Health Council, as follows:
1. The request for euthanasia must come only from the patient and must be entirely free and voluntary. 2. The patient's request must be well-considered, durable and persistent. 3. The patient must be experiencing intolerable (not necessarily physical) suffering, with no prospect of improvement. 4. Euthanasia must be a last resort. Other alternatives to alleviate the patient's situation must have been considered and found wanting. 5. Euthanasia must be performed by a physician. 5. 106NJ451, 452 (H.R. 1985) . See also .J. Keown, The Law and Practice of Euthanasia in The Netherlands, 108 L.Q. REv. 51, 51-57 (1992 6. The physician must consult with an independent physician colleague who has experience in this field.
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Moreover, having performed euthanasia, the doctor should not certify death by "natural causes," which would involve the offense of falsifying a death certificate, but should call in the local medical examiner to investigate. The medical examiner should carry out an external inspection of the corpse, interview the doctor, and file a report with the local prosecutor, who should decide whether to investigate further or to allow the body to be handed over to the next-of-kin. Three months before the landmark Supreme Court decision in 1984, the K.N.M.G. published a report setting out its criteria for permissible euthanasia. 1 ' They are substantially similar to the conditions just listed and require a voluntary request by the patient which is well-considered and persistent, unacceptable suffering by the patient, and consultation by the doctor with a colleague working in the same institution and with an independent doctor.'" The K.N.M.G. subsequently formulated, in collaboration with the National Association of Nurses, certain "Guidelines for Euthanasia" 1 " which embody the above criteria.
B. "Precisely Defined" and "Strict"?
Before considering the evidence which indicates the extent to which the practice of euthanasia conforms to the above requirements, some comment is called for on the nature of those requirements and particularly on the extent to which they are capable of closely regulating the practice of euthanasia.
A leading Dutch defender of euthanasia has claimed (a claim reproduced with uncritical, almost robot-like repetition in many newspaper articles on this subject) that the Guidelines are "strict" and "precise."' 4 However, even a cursory examination indicates that this is not the case. For one thing, it is not even possible precisely to identify the legal criteria, let alone define them: the Supreme Court did not lay down a precise list and lower courts have issued sets of criteria which are far from congruent. For another, as Professor Leenen, a leading Dutch health lawyer (and supporter of legalized euthanasia) has 10. Keown, supra note 5, at 56. observed, concepts such as "unbearable pain" (a fortiori, one might add, "suffering") are open to subjective interpretation and are incapable of precise definition. 1 5 As for the assertion that the Guidelines are "strict," this too is difficult to sustain, not only because of their imprecision but also because of the absence of any effective independent check on the doctor's decision-making to ensure that they are satisfied.
A hypothetical case may help highlight their inherent vagueness. A leading, respected Dutch practitioner of euthanasia has said that he would be put in a very difficult position if a patient told him that he wanted euthanasia because he felt a nuisance to his relatives who wanted him dead so they could enjoy his estate. Asked whether he would rule out euthanasia in such a case, the doctor replied:
I . . . think in the end I wouldn't, because that kind of influence -these children wanting the money now -is the same kind of power from the past that ... shaped us all. The same thing goes for religion . . . education . . . the kind of family he was raised in, all kinds of influences from the past that we can't put aside.' 6 If such a leading practitioner of euthanasia, who has delivered many lectures on the subject inside and outside the Netherlands (including lectures to Dutch police on how to handle euthanasia cases), can interpret the Guidelines'requirements of "entirely free and voluntary request" and "unbearable suffering" as possibly extending to such a case, little more need be said about their inherent vagueness and elasticity. In short, because of the Guidelines' vagueness and the fact that they entrust the decision-making to the individual practitioner, they are simply incapable of ensuring that euthanasia is carried out only in accordance with the criteria they specify. The empirical evidence which confirms the inability of the Guidelines to regulate euthanasia effectively is set out in Part II.
II. EUTHANASIA IN PRACTICE: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A. The Origins of the Remmelink Commission and the van der Maas Survey
The Dutch coalition government which assumed office in 1989 decided to appoint a Commission to report on the "extent To assist the discharge of this responsibility, the Commission asked PJ. van, der Maas, Professor of Public Health and Social Medicine at Erasmus University, to carry out a survey which would produce qualitative and quantitative information on the practice of euthanasia. The Commission and van der Maas agreed that the survey should embrace all medical decisions affecting the end of life so that euthanasia could be seen within that broader context. The umbrella term "Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life" ("MDELs") includes "all decisions by physicians concerning courses of action aimed at hastening the end of life of the patient or courses of action for which the physician takes into account the probability that the end of life of the patient is hastened." 19 MDELs comprise the administration, supply, or prescription of a drug, the withdrawal or withholding of a treatment (including resuscitation and tube-feeding), and the refusal of a request for euthanasia or assisted suicide. 2° 
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A previous paper of mine1 4 suggested that the Dutch experience lends support to the "slippery slope" argument in both its "logical" and "empirical" forms. 2 5 Do the Report and Survey require that suggestion to be qualified? The answer on an uncritical reading of the Report would be yes. But a reading of the Report in the light of its Survey yields a contrary answer. Indeed, taken together, the Survey and Report tend forcefully to confirm the application of the argument in both its forms.
B. The Findings of the Survey and the Conclusions of the Commission
After an outline of the Survey's findings about the incidence of euthanasia, consideration will be given to the light the Survey and the Report shed on the extent to which doctors observe the criteria laid down by the courts and the K.N.M.G. in practice. Attention will focus on the Survey rather than the Report because the Report contains the Commission's conclusions in the light of the Survey, while the Survey is a comprehensive empirical study which stands independent of the Report. The conclusions drawn in the Report are frequently difficult to square with the findings of the Survey.
Methodology
Before turning to the Survey's findings, a summary of its methodology is appropriate. The Survey comprised three studies.
a. The Retrospective Study 6
A sample of 406 doctors was drawn from general practitioners (G.P.s), specialists (concerned with MDELs), and nursing home doctors, of whom 91% agreed to participate. The doctors were interviewed on average for two and a half hours, almost always by another doctor. 2 7 The respondent was asked about relevant types of decisions. If he or she had made a decision of a 24. Keown, supra note 5. . See Survey, supra note 3, at Part II (chapters 4-10). 27. Id. at [14] [15] [16] [17] 191 . The authors considered whether those who refused to participate formed a select group which could lead to serious bias and concluded that, in the light of the total number of refusals (41) and the variety of reasons for refusing (mainly lack of time), this could hardly be so. The 15 who refused to participate because they disapproved of the Survey, did not wish to comment, or opposed euthanasia could only have introduced a "very modest" bias. Id. at 228. This reasoning is unpersuasive: does the conclusion excluding bias not depend on answers which are unverified? Is it not possible that some of the 41 who declined to participate frequently performed given type, the last occasion on which he or she had done so was discussed in greater detail. At most, ten cases were discussed with each doctor. 2 "
b. The Death Certificate StudyP
This study examined a stratified sample of 8;500 deaths occurring in the Netherlands from July through November 1990. The treating doctor was identified from each death certificate and was sent a short questionnaire which could be returned anonymously. The response rate was 73%.30
c. The Prospective Study? 1
Each of the doctors interviewed in the retrospective study was asked at interview if he or she would complete a questionnaire about each of their patients who died in the following six months. This study had several advantages: there would be little memory distortion because the questionnaire would be completed soon after the death, it would provide additional information to strengthen the quantitative basis of the interview study, and the carefully planned selection of respondents meant that the responses were representative of 95% of all deaths. The study ran from mid-November 1990 to the end of May 1991. 80% of those involved in the first study participated, completing over 2,250 questionnaires. 3 2 In all, each of some 322 doctors supplied information about, on average, seven deaths. 5 3 The method of collection of data in all three studies was such that anonymity of participants could be guaranteed. upon the latter's request." 3 6 How many cases of "euthanasia" so defined were there in 1990?
The three studies differed as to the incidence of euthanasia, yielding respective figures of 1.9%, 1.7%, and 2.6% of all deaths. The researchers felt that the difference between the second and third estimates was "probably due to the existence of a boundary area between euthanasia and intensifying of the alleviation of pain and/or symptoms" 3 7 and to the probability of the third study counting cases of pain alleviation as cases of "euthanasia," thereby exaggerating its incidence. 3 8 Of the three studies it is, however, arguably the third which produces the most accurate estimate of "euthanasia." As the authors of the Survey point out, the respondents in the second study had no information other than the questionnaire and an accompanying letter. Those in the third, however, had participated in the physician interviews, discussing one or more cases from their practice and the crucial concepts in the questionnaire for over two hours with a trained interviewer. The authors, noting that a "great number" 9 of interviewees commented that the interview had clarified their thinking about MDELs, suggest the possibility of a learning effect: familiarity with the questionnaire, in which the question about euthanasia followed those relating to other MDELs, may have led the respondents to reply negatively to the earlier questions knowing that the question about euthanasia was to come. The authors conclude that the most important fact was that the respondents in the third study "changed their approach with respect to their intention when administering morphine due to their recent intensive confrontation with thinking about this complex of problems."' If the thinking of participants in the third study had been clarified by their participation in the first study, their responses are surely more likely to have been reliable than those in the second study, particularly since there was an increased risk of memory distortion in the second study because it was retrospective. The authors' conclusion, however, is that in light of all three studies, "euthanasia" occurred in about 1.8% of all deaths, or about 2,300 cases, 4 " and that there were almost 400 cases of assisted suicide, some 0.3% of all deaths. 4 2 More than half of the physicians regularly involved with terminal patients indicated that they had performed "euthanasia" or had assisted suicide and only 12% of the doctors said they would never do so.
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These figures document euthanasia in its narrowest sense: intentional, active termination of life at the patient's request. But the authors of the Survey themselves go on, rightly, to consider euthanasia in a somewhat wider but still precise and realistic sense. They estimate that in a further 1,000 cases (or 0.8% of all deaths) physicians administered a drug "with the explicit purpose of hastening the end of life without an explicit request of the patient."' Beyond this, the authors' commentary does not adequately consider the additional range of evidence yielded by the Survey. Many other MDELs also involved an intent to hasten death. In 17.5% of the cases (or 22,500 cases) 45 palliative drugs were administered in "such high doses.., that [they] almost certainly would shorten the life of the patient." 4 6 In 65% (or 14,625) of these cases the doctors administered the medication merely " [t] aking into account the probability that life would be shortened." 4 7 However, in 30% (or 6,750) of the cases, the medication was administered " [p] (Table 6 .10).
No shortening of life occurred in 8% of these cases. Id. at 73 (Table 7. 3). * 90% of these patients (22,500) had died by the time of the interview and there had been no shortening of life in 20% of these cases. Id. at 90 (Table 8 .14). ** 82% of these patients (4,756) had died by the time of the interview and there had been no shortening of life in 19% of these cases. Id. at 82 (Table 8.6 ). # This sub-total refers to cases where doctors "explicitly" intended to shorten life by act or omission. ## This total refers to cases where doctors intended ("explicitly" or "partly") to hasten death by act or omission. Both it and the preceding sub-total therefore include (as does the Survey) cases where life may not in fact have been shortened and cases in the asterisked categories where patients had not died by the time of the Survey.
Thus, it becomes clear that, while the Commission stated that the figure of 2,700 cases of "euthanasia" and assisted suicide "does not warrant the assumption that euthanasia in the Netherlands occurs on an excessive scale . . . ,"7 the total number of euthanasiast acts and omissions in 1990 was in reality far higher than the Commission claims. To clarify and confirm this conclusion it is necessary to look more closely at the definitions used by the authors of the Survey in classifying their data to produce the figure of 2,700.
The commission defined euthanasia as the "intentional action to terminate a person's life, performed by somebody else than the involved person upon the latter's request."8 Similarly, the definition adopted in the Survey was "the purposeful acting to terminate life by someone other than the person concerned upon request of the latter." 59 These definitions echo the one embraced by the central committee of the KN.M.G. in its 1984 report on euthanasia as all actions "aimed at"' terminating a patient's life at his explicit request. This report added that a majority of the committee had rejected a sub-division of "active" and "passive" euthanasia as "morally superfluous" 6 1 and undesirable: "All activities or non-activities with the purpose to terminate a patient's life are defined as euthanasia. " 6 2 The authors of the Survey distinguished the following states of mind:
1) (acting with) the explicit purpose of hastening the end of life; 2) (acting) partly with the purpose of hastening the end of life; 3) (acting while) taking into account the probability that the end of life will be hastened. 6 3 They explained that the first category, unlike the third, applied where the patient's death was the intended outcome of the action. The second category was used because sometimes an act was performed with a particular aim (such as pain relief) but the side effect (such as death) was "not unwelcome. " " The authors felt that such an effect should be categorized as intentional because in order to count as unintentional a death "should not in fact have been desired." 6 5 The category related to a situation in which the "death of the patient was not foremost in the physician's mind but neither was death unwelcome;"' this was regarded by the authors as a "type" of intention. 6 7 As the Table reveals , doctors intended to accelerate death in far more than the 2,700 cases classified by the Commission as "euthanasia" and assisted suicide. The Commission total ignores the 1,000 cases of intentional killing without request and three further categories where there is said to have been some intention to shorten life: first, the 8,100 (1,350 + 6,750) cases of increasing the dosage of palliative drugs; second, the 8,750 (4,000 + 4,750) cases of withholding or withdrawing treatment without request; and third the 5,800 (1,508 + 4,292) cases of withholding or withdrawing treatment on request.' Adding these 23,650 cases to the 2,700 produces a total of 26,350 cases in which the Survey states that doctors intended, by act or omission, to shorten life. This raises the incidence of euthanasia from around 2% to over 20% of all deaths in the Netherlands.
It could be argued that the 23,650 cases are not "euthanasia" because they are not cases of intentional killing at the patient's request. There are, however, two counter-arguments. First, some of them clearly are intentional killing at the patient's request. In relation, for example, to the 1,350 cases in which it was the explicit purpose of the doctor to shorten life by increasing the dosage of palliative drugs, the Survey discloses: "In all these cases the patient had at some time indicated something about terminating life and an explicit request had been made in two thirds of the cases." 6 9 Indeed, the authors comment: "This 65. Id. 66. Id. 67. Id. 68. By no means were all of the patients from whom treatment was withdrawn on request terminal. Life was shortened by one to four weeks in 16% of the cases, by one to six months in 43%, and even longer in 13%. Id. at 82 (Table 8 .6). Moreover, three of the four reasons most frequently given by the patient for requesting withdrawal ("loss of dignity" (31%), "tiredness of life" (28%), and "dependence" (24%), id. at 82 (Table 8 .4)) appear (unlike the remaining reason -"burden of treatment" (43%)) quite consistent with a suicidal intent. However, as the respondent doctors were not given the opportunity of stating that they withheld or withdrew treatment merely foreseeing that life would be shortened, the figures indicating that doctors intended to shorten life in a/l cases should be treated with some caution, and their categorization here as cases of euthanasiast omissions is subject to this caveat.
69. Id. at 72.
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situation is therefore rather similar to euthanasia." 7° It is unclear, then, why the Commission does not regard these as cases of "euthanasia;" they seem to fall squarely within its definition. Interestingly, a member of the Commission (in fact, the member who wrote the Report) has subsequently agreed that those cases where doctors had, with the explicit purpose of shortening the patient's life and at the patient's explicit request, administered palliative drugs could properly be categorized as euthanasia. 7 1 The second counter-argument is that the true scale of euthanasia can properly be gauged only when the Commission's abnormally narrow definition of "euthanasia" is replaced by a standard definition such as "when the death of a human being is brought about on purpose as part of the medical care being given to him." 7 2 If this more realistic definition is applied, then the presentation of the data in the Survey suggests that there were a further 23,650 deaths by euthanasia.
However, there remains a further question about the proper interpretation of the Survey's definitions, and thus of its figures. Is it appropriate to include the 15,792 cases in which hastening death was only "partly" the doctor's intention? These cases were distinguished in the Survey from those where the doctor merely foresaw the acceleration of death (where he proceeded " [t ] aking into account the probability that life would be shortened" 73 ). If the doctor's purpose in these cases was, albeit partly, to hasten death, then it seems quite appropriate to regard these cases as instances of euthanasia. By analogy, if racial discrimination is the intentional (purposeful) treating of one person less favorably than another on racial grounds and, say, an employer takes advantage of a need to make cutbacks in order to get rid of his black workers, he may be said to have acted partly with a view to firing black workers, even though his primary purpose is to save his company by reducing employment costs. On the other hand, it is arguable that these are not necessarily cases in which the doctor's purpose was to hasten death. Notwithstanding the researchers' treatment of these cases as ones of purposeful killing, their explanation of this category, and in particular their apparent understanding of the concept of "purpose,". in fact leave the matter unclear. The implication in their explanation that death in these cases was "desired" does indeed suggest that the doctor intended to shorten life, but the reference to death as a "not unwelcome" consequence suggests that death, while not regretted, may not, in some of these cases, have been any part of the doctor's purpose or goal.
Although it may well be that the doctor's intention in most, if not all, of these cases .was to shorten life (a conclusion which would be consistent with the finding that no fewer than 88% of Dutch doctors had performed euthanasia or would be willing to do so 74 ) the possibility that it was not cannot be ruled out. These cases are, therefore, regarded in this paper as cases of intentional shortening of life subject to this caveat. However, the force of the following critique of Dutch euthanasia in no way depends on their inclusion. For even if they are discounted, the total number of life-shortening, acts and omissions where the. doctor's primary intention (more graphically but less precisely called "explicit purpose" by the Survey) was to kill, and which are therefore indubitably euthanasiast, is 10,558. This figure is almost four times higher than the number of cases categorized as "euthanasia" and assisted suicide by the Commission and amounts to over 8% of all deaths in the Netherlands. In other words, almost 1 in 12 of all deaths in the Netherlands in 1990 was intentionally accelerated by a doctor.
3.. "Dances With Data?"
The authors of the van der Maas Survey recently argued that I (and a number of other commentators on Dutch euthanasia) have misinterpreted their findings. 7 5 One of their main criticisms (to which I shall limit myself in the interests of conciseness) is that I have inaccurately inflated the number of cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide disclosed by their Survey. I respectfully demur.
It will be recalled that van der Maas and his colleagues concluded that there were 2,300 cases of euthanasia and 400 cases of assisted suicide 7 6 and that the discrepancy between their total of 2,700 and my total of 10,558 stems largely from their peculiarly narrow definition of "euthanasia" as "active, voluntary euthanasia," in contrast with my standard definition of "euthanasia" as 74 . Id. at 40 ( the intentional shortening of a patient's life, by act or omission. Their arguments for rejecting my total are quite unpersuasive. Their main argument is that "intentions cannot carry the full weight of a moral evaluation on their-own"" because "intentions are essentially private matters. Ultimately only the agent 'decides' What his intentions are, and different agents may describe the same actions in the same situations as performed with different intentions. " " And, they add, the agent's purpose may change over time, so what is to count as the "definitive description?" 7 9 This line of argument is remarkable. They agree that euthanasia is to be distinguished from other MDELs in that it involves the intentional (purposeful) shortening of life; indeed, one of the welcome features of their meticulous Survey is the care they took to ascertain the doctors' state of mind when hastening death. They specifically asked whether the doctors acted with the "explicit purpose" of shortening life, or "partly with the purpose" of shortening life, or merely "taking into account the probability" of shortening life, and the doctors replied that in some 10,558 cases it had been their explicit intention to shorten life. Why are the doctors' own answers not taken as the "definitive description" of their intention? If the authors thought it impossible to discern the doctors' intention, why did they bother asking them?
The authors add that no doctor who performs euthanasia does so with the sole intent to kill: "His or her intention can always be described as trying to relieve the suffering of his or her patient. This is exactly what infuriates Dutch physicians when, after reporting the case they are treated as criminals and murderers." 8 " However, while the doctor's ultimate intention may be to relieve suffering, he intends to do so by shortening the patient's life, which is precisely why, in most jurisdictions, the doctor who performs euthanasia is liable for murder. If an heir kills his rich father by slipping a lethal poison into his tea, would they deny that this was murder on the ground that the heir's intention was not to kill and "can always be described as" trying to accelerate his inheritance?
The authors continue that it is wrong to rest the moral evaluation entirely on intention: "For a moral evaluation, more is to be taken into account, such as the presence of a request of the patient, the futility of further medical treatment, the sequelae of 77. Van the decision to stop treatment (e.g. will this cause heavy distress?), the interests of others involved such as. family and so on."" 1 This muddles the argument still further. The question at issue here is not the moral evaluation of cases of euthanasia but their incidence, and this is a matter of definition, not evaluation. And standard definitions of euthanasia include cases where the doctor, by act or omission, intentionally shortens life.
A further argument they advance is that if the "context" is taken into account, it can be questioned whether the intentions were euthanasiast. As an example they cite the 6% of cases of alleviation of pain and symptoms in which doctors stated that their explicit intention was to shorten life. The authors seek to distinguish these cases from euthanasia on the ground that they involve a failure of palliative care followed by the use of higher doses which may lead to a point at which "the physician realizes that he or she actually hopes that the patient dies."" 2 His or her intention is "not necessarily"" 3 the same with respect to euthanasia. A physician performing euthanasia would surely try another lethal drug if the first failed, whereas a physician administering opiates would "never" do so. 8 4 This argument, too, fails. First, in these cases doctors stated it was their explicit, not partial, intention to shorten life; the authors give no reason to doubt the accuracy of this response. Second, the argument appears to rest on the unsubstantiated speculation that, had the higher dose failed to shorten life, the doctor would not have resorted to another method. Even if this were so, the argument is specious, resting on a patent non sequitur. If A attempts to kill B by method MI, which fails, his decision not to resort to method M2 in no way establishes he did not intend to kill by method MI.
In sum, the arguments advanced by van der Maas and his colleagues against my total of 10,558 cases of euthanasia backfire, succeeding only in highlighting the inaccurate basis on which they have calculated their own total of 2,700. 
C. Conformity with the Guidelines?
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request which was "well-considered, durable and persistent?" In how many was there "intolerable" suffering for which euthanasia was a "last resort?" And in how many cases did the doctor consult with a colleague and report the case to the legal authorities, whether prosecutor, police, or local medical examiner? 5
1. An "Entirely Free and Voluntary" Request Which Was "Well-Considered, Durable and Persistent" Doctors stated that in the 2,700 cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide there was an "explicit request"" 6 in 96%; the request was "wholly made by the patient" 8 7 in 99% of all cases and "repeated"' m in 94%; and in 100% of the cases the patient had a "good insight" 89 into his disease and its prognosis. Oddly, no specific question was asked about the voluntariness of the request and there is no evidence of any mechanism to ensure that the request was voluntary. Moreover, the request was purely oral in 60% of cases 9 " and, when made to a G.P. in cases where a nurse was caring for the -patient, the G.P. more often than not failed to consult her. 9 1
There is no way of gauging the accuracy of the doctors' uncorroborated statements about the patients' requests. Even if they are true, however, the Survey data shows that in the 10,558 cases in which it was the doctor's primary purpose to hasten 85. 98% of the doctors stated that they were aware of the "rules of due care" formulated by the K.N.M.G., the Health Council, and the Government. Survey, supra note 3, at 95. When asked what they were, 89% mentioned consultation, but only 66% the need for a seriously considered request; 42% a voluntary request; 37% "unacceptable" suffering; and 18% a long-standing desire to die. Id. at 95-96 (Table 9.1). When shown 14 guidelines, however, and asked to rank them in importance, 98% mentioned voluntariness and only 67% consultation. Id. at 96 ( Table 9 .2).
A smaller, postal survey of euthanasia by nursing home physicians between 1986 and 1990 revealed that, in over one in five cases, euthanasia was administered less than a week after the first discussion with the patient and in 7% of the cases, in less than a day. In 35% of the cases, euthanasia was administered less than a week after the first request. M. (Table 10. 3). By contrast, 96% of specialists and nursing home doctors consulted nursing staff. Id. Further, two thirds of G.P.s said they felt it was up to the doctor in certain circumstances to raise the topic of euthanasia. Id. at 101. death, there was in the majority (52%) no explicit request from the patient. Similarly, in a majority (58%) of the 26,350 cases in which it was the doctor's primary or secondary intention to shorten life, the doctor shortened life without the patient's explicit request.
a. "Life-Terminating Acts Without the Patient's Explicit Request"
In the light of the three studies, the Survey concludes: On an annual basis there are, in [t] he Netherlands, some thousand cases (0.8% of all deaths) for which physicians prescribe, supply or administer a drug with the explicit purpose of hastening the end of life without an explicit request of the patient.
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In over half these cases, the decision was discussed with the patient or the patient had previously indicated his wish for the hastening of death, but in "several hundred cases there was no discussion with the patient and there also was no known wish from the patient for hastening the end of life." 9 " Virtually all cases, state the authors, involved seriously ill and terminal patients who obviously were suffering a great deal and were no longer able to express their wishes, though there was a "small number" 9 4 of cases in which the decision could have been discussed with the patient.
The fact that doctors administered a lethal drug without an express request in 1,000 cases -almost half as many as they did on request -is striking. So too is the Commission's reaction to this statistic. The Commission observes that the ("few dozen" 95 ) cases in which the doctor killed a competent patient without request "must be prevented in [the] future," 9 6 and that one means would be "strict compliance with the scrupulous care " 9 ' required for euthanasia "including the requirement that all facts of the case are put down in writ[i] ng." 98 However, the Commission defends the other cases of non-requested killing, stating that "active intervention" 99 by the doctor was usually "inevitable" 1°°b ecause of the patient's "death agony." 10 1 That is why, it explains, it regards these cases as "care for the dying." 10 2 It adds that the ultimate justification for killing in these cases was the patient's "unbearable suffering."°103 The Commission's assertion that most of the 1,000 patients were incompetent and in their "death agony" should not pass unchallenged. The physician interviews indicate that 14% of the patients were totally competent and a further 11% partly competent; 1°4 that 21% had a life expectancy of one to four weeks and 7% of one to six months" 0 5 (the Survey classed patients as "dying" if their life had been shortened only by "hours or days," not by "weeks or months""°) and that doctors-did not list "agony" as a reason for killing these patients. The reasons given by doctors were the absence of any prospect of improvement (60%); the futility of all medical therapy (39%); avoidance of "needless prolongation" (33%); the relatives' inability to cope (32%), and "low quality of life" (31%).1"7 Pain or suffering was mentioned by only 30%."°8 And, even in relation to these 30%, if they were essentially cases -of increasing pain or symptom treatment to shorten life, why did the doctors not classify them under that heading?"
In short, the Commission's defense of these 1,000 cases would appear to be based on a shaky factual foundation and its attempted ethical justification amounts to little more than a bare assertion that killing without request, a practice in breach of cardinal criteria for permissible euthanasia, is morally acceptable.
Id.
104. Seventy-five percent of the patients were "totally unable to assess the situation and take a decision adequately." However, 14% were totally and 11% partly ("not totally") able to do so. Survey, supra note 3, at 61 (Table 6 .4). The authors describe a person "not totally able" as "partially able to assess the situation and on this basis adequately take a decision." Id. at 23. According to the death certificate study, 36% were competent. Note that in the instruction to the interviewer it was not specified as a constraint that the cases involved in the study must be cases in which the explicit purpose was hastening the end of life. Furthermore. and surprisingly, no question was asked about the doctor's intention which, as the authors note, "complicates the interpretation of the results." Id. at 57.
HenkJochemsen, Euthanasia in Holland: An Ethical Critique of the New Law, 20J. MED. ETHICS 212, 213 (1994).
On the basis of this assertion, the Commission proceeds to recommend that doctors should report such cases in the same way as they report cases of voluntary euthanasia.
The Government has implemented the Commission's recommendation that euthanasia without request should be reported by incorporating the reporting procedure into the law regulating the disposal of the dead. The procedure makes it clear that it applies whether or not the patient requested euthanasia.
1 1 '
b. Other Cases of Intentional Life-Shortening Without Explicit Request
In addition to the 1,000 cases of active life termination without explicit request there were many more in which the patient made no explicit request that his life be shortened.
In 59% (or 4,779) of the 8,100 cases in which doctors are said to have intended to hasten death by pain-killing drugs, the patient had "never indicated anything about terminating life,""' and there had been no explicit request in a further 9% (or 729),111 making 5,508 cases in which there had been no explicit 114. In 17% of the cases, the patient had indicated something about life termination but the "request was not strongly explicit." Id. If these cases are included, the number of cases of life shortening without explicit request becomes 6,885. Thus, in only 15% of the cases was there a "strongly explicit" request. Id.
115. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. In 18% of cases the patient had "indicated something at some time about terminating life" and in a further 13% there had been some discussion with the patient. Survey, supra note 3, at 88 ( to objective medical standards. The commission would define a treatment without any medical use as therapeutical interference that gives no hope whatsoever for any positive effect upon the patient. To the application of this kind of futile medicine, no one is entitled. It is undisputed that the medical decision whether a particular action is useful or not, belongs to normal medical practice.
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The Commission appears confused. First, the concept of "futile treatment" was not used in the Survey in relation to withdrawal of treatment, because the authors felt that its meaning was open to "variable" interpretation.
117 Second, the preamble to the relevant questions suggests that they were not asking about the withdrawal of futile treatment, that is, treatment which was unlikely or incapable of achieving its normal therapeutic purpose, but rather about the withdrawal of treatment which was preserving "futile" lives, that is, lives which were not thought to be worth preserving:
[ That the questions were concerned with "futile" lives rather than ineffectual treatment is further suggested by the authors' explanation of this series of questions: Briefly, two types of situations are discussed here. On the one hand therapies are involved which will probably meet with little or no success. Such treatment can be withdrawn or withheld for this reason. On the other hand there are cases in which therapies which can have a considerable (more than one month) life-prolonging effect but in which 116. OuTuNE, supra note 23, at 3-4.
117.
There is no uniform definition of the concept of "medically futile therapy." The term "futile" depends too much on what is considered to "have a point," i.e., to make sense. This concept was therefore not used in the questionnaires because its interpretation is too varied. Survey, supra note 3, at 24.
Id. at 84-85.
prolongation of life is undesirable or pointless and treatment is withdrawn or withheld for this reason. 1 9 They add that doctors were asked to discuss "only the second type" of situation.
1 2 Third, it seems clear that the question was so understood by at least some of the respondents. Thirty-five percent of the doctors replied that their (primary or secondary) intention was to hasten death, not to withdraw a futile treatment.
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That the lives of so many patients were shortened without explicit request is striking. Hardly less striking is the fact that by no means were all of the patients killed without request incompetent. It will be recalled that of the 1,000 actively killed without request, 14% were (according to the physician interviews) totally competent and a further 11% partly competent. Van der Wal has aptly commented that in these cases the right to self-determination was "seriously undermined." 1 2 2 Moreover, of the 8,100 patients whose deaths are said to have been intentionally accelerated by palliative drugs, 60% (or 2,867) of those who had never indicated anything about life termination were competent. The Commission concludes that the Survey "disproves the assertion often expressed, that non-voluntary active termination of life occurs more frequently in the Netherlands than voluntary termination."1 25 However, if intentional termination by omission is included, as it should be if an accurate overall picture is to be presented, the Survey indicates that non-voluntary euthanasia is in fact more common than voluntary euthanasia. As the above Table illustrates, the Survey discloses that in 1990 doctors intentionally sought to shorten more lives without than with the patient's explicit request. It was their primary aim to kill 10,558 patients, 5,450 (52%) of whom had not explicitly asked to have their lives shortened. If one includes cases in which the patient's death is referred to as part of what the doctor aimed to achieve, then the total number of intentional killings by doctors may not The Survey throws considerable doubt on whether euthanasia was confined to patients who were "suffering unbearably" and for whom it was a "last resort." 2 6 For example, doctors were asked in interviews which reason(s) patients most often gave for requesting euthanasia. In 57% of the cases, patients cited a "loss of dignity;" in 46% "not dying in a dignified way;" in 33% "dependence;" and in 23% "tiredness of life." 1 27 Only 46% mentioned "pain. " 
A recent case concerned a fifty year old woman who had lost two sons, one to suicide, the other to cancer and who repeatedly asked her psychiatrist, a Dr. Chabot, to help her die. Dr. Chabot assisted her to commit suicide and was prosecuted but acquitted. The prosecution's appeal to the Court of Appeal was unsuccessful but an appeal to the Supreme Court resulted in the doctor's conviction on the ground that the doctor should have ensured that one of the doctors he had consulted had personally examined the patient. A novel and disturbing feature of the case is that the woman was not terminally or, indeed, even physically ill. The suffering which was considered sufficient to warrant assisted suicide was purely mental, resulting from a "depression in a narrower sense without psychotic characteristics in the context of a complicated grieving process."" 126. The Commission states that Dutch doctors regard the "intolerable suffering of the patient and/or his natural desire for a quiet death" as the only grounds on which to perform euthanasia. REPORT, supra note 21, at 32. The reference to these grounds in the alternative, without disapproval, is revealing: it confirms that neither all doctors nor the Commission regard both as essential for euthanasia to be permissible.
127. Survey, supra note 3, at 45 ( In relation to cases of withholding or withdrawal of treatment without explicit request and with intent to hasten death, the basis for the decision appears to have been simply a belief that, in the words of the preamble to the question put, "considerable prolongation of life" was considered "undesirable or even futile.""' That Dutch doctors regard "unbearable suffering" as an essential criterion is, moreover, hardly confirmed by the agreement of two thirds of those interviewed with the proposition that " [e] veryone is entitled to decide over their own life and death." l "'
Nor does it appear that euthanasia was invariably a "last resort." Doctors said that treatment alternatives remained in one in five cases (21%) but that, in almost all of these cases, they were refused.
1 2 One in three G.P.s who decided that there were no alternatives had not sought advice from a colleague.
1 33 When asked to rank the Guidelines in order of importance, only 64% of respondents said absence of treatment alternatives was "(very)
important."
Moreover, even in the four out of five cases in which the doctors said there were "no treatment alternatives," they apparently meant that there were no "alternatives to the current treatment," rather than no "alternatives to euthanasia." The question basis for the necessity defense could be laid only where the patient had been examined by an independent doctor who had assessed the gravity of the suffering and possibilities for its alleviation. As the Court of Appeal had not made such a finding in this case it had not been in a position to conclude that a situation of necessity existed. Although the doctor's conviction was restored, he was not punished. For commentaries on the case see T. Schalken, 656 N.J. 3256-59 (1994) 48 (1994) . 130 . Survey, supra note 3, at 85. For example, the evidence in relation to the 8,750 cases in which doctors stated that they withheld or withdrew treatment without request with intent to shorten life does not indicate that all the patients were suffering unbearably and that euthanasia was a last resort. For one thing, given that 58% of the patients were unable to "assess the decision and take a decision adequately," how could the doctor assess the extent of the patients' suffering (if any), particularly as the patients' conditions varied? Id. at 88 ( interpretation. Also, in response to a question about the aim of the treatment at the time when the decision to carry out euthanasia or assisted suicide was made, 77% of the doctors replied that the aim was palliative, 10% that is was life prolonging, and 2% that it was curative. Only 14% said there was no treatment. 36 In other words, just because there might have been no treatment alternatives to the existing treatment does not mean that the existing treatment was not an alternative to euthanasia. But even if the palliative treatment given in 77% of cases was not preventing intolerable suffering and was so ineffectual that euthanasia was thought to be the only alternative, does this (and the fact that in 46% of cases pain was one of the reasons most frequently given by patients as a reason for wanting euthanasia) not raise questions about the quality of the palliative care that the patients were receiving? A report on palliative care published in 1987 by the Dutch Health Council concluded that a majority of cancer patients in pain suffered unnecessarily because of health professionals' lack of expertise.
13 7 Similarly, more recent research into pain management at the Netherlands Cancer Institute, Amsterdam, contains the "critical and worrisome overall finding.., that pain management was judged to be inadequate in slightly more than 50% of evaluated cases." 138. Karin L. Dorrepaal et al., Pain Experience and Pain Management Among Hospitalized Cancer Patients, 63 CANCER 593, 598 (1989) . Referring to this study, Zbigniew Zylic, Medical Director at the newest hospice in the Netherlands, comments that it does not warrant a general judgment about terminal care in the Netherlands but should be taken as a warning and a stimulus for further studies. He notes that "cancer pain treatment and symptom control does not receive enough attention and in many places, it is practiced at a very poor level. As yet, there is no specific training available in palliative care." Zbigniew Zylic, The Story Behind the Blank Spot, 10 Am. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATWVE CARE 30, 32 (1993) . He adds that there are no comprehensive hospices in the Netherlands because the high standard of care in hospitals and nursing-homes and the Government's policy to reduce institutional beds have combined to discourage the hospice system. While hospitals are officially encouraged to provide hospice care, the necessary resources are not provided. Zylic urges the establishment of more hospices. Id. at 33-34.
Interestingly, 40% of the Dutch doctors interviewed in the van der Maas Survey expressed agreement with the proposition that "[a]dequate alleviation of pain and/or symptoms and personal care of the dying patient make euthanasia unnecessary."" 3 9
Yet the Commission concludes that its total of 2,700 cases of "euthanasia" and assisted suicide shows that "euthanasia" is not being used as an alternative to good palliative medicine or terminal care." 4 This observation is quite unsupported by the data which reveals not 2,700 but over 10,500 unambiguously euthanasiast acts and omissions. It also sits uneasily with the Commission's later observation about the inadequacy.of such care in the Netherlands:
The research report shows that the medical decision process with regard to the end of life demands more and more expertise in a number of different areas. First of all medical and technical know-how, especially in the field of the treatment of pain, of prognosis and of alternative options for the treatment of disorders that cause insufferable pain. 141 It adds:
Especially doctors, but nurses as well, will have to be trained in terminal care .... Optimal care for someone who is dying implies that the doctor has knowledge of adequate treatments for pain, of alternatives for the treatment of complaints about unbearable pain and that he is aware of the moment when he must allow the process of dying to run its natural course. Doctors still lack sufficient knowledge of this care.... In a country that is rated among the .best in the world when it comes to birth care, knowledge with regard to care for the dying should not be lacking.'
If there is such a lack of knowledge, does this not confirm and help to explain the Survey evidence which indicates that euthanasia is being used as an alternative to appropriate palliative care?
14 3 139. Survey, supra note 3, at 102 (Table 9 .7). 140. OUTLINE, supra note 23, at 2; REPORT, supra note 21, at 31.
141. OUTLINE, supra note 23, at 7.
Id.
143. An expert committee of the World Health Organization has concluded: "now that a practicable alternative to death in pain exists, there should be concentrated efforts to implement programmes of palliative care, rather than a yielding to pressure for legal euthanasia." WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CANCER PAIN RELIEF AND PALLIATIVE CARE, TECHNICAL REP.
SERIES No. 804 (1990) . Dr. Pieter Admiraal, one of the leading practitioners of euthanasia in the Netherlands, has written that "in most cases, pain can be -proposed scheme of consultation with-two colleagues, one of whom is independent, has never been put into effect. Doctors stated that they had consulted a colleague in 84% of cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide. 1 " The Survey does not explain the form, substance or outcome of the consultations. Again, in respect to the 1,000 acts of life termination without request -cases where presumably consultation would assume special importance -only a minority (48%) of doctors consulted a colleague. 1 45 Moreover, 40% of G.P.s stated that they did not think that consultation was very important.' 46
b. Reporting
Only a minority of cases of "euthanasia" were duly reported to the legal authorities. In almost three out of four cases (72%) doctors (three out of four G.P.s and two out of three specialists) certified that death was due to "natural causes." 14 7 By so doing, they not only failed to comply with one of the Guidelines whose importance has been continually stressed by the K.N.M.G., but they also committed the criminal offense of falsifying a death certificate.
The three most important reasons doctors gave for falsifying the certificate included the "fuss" of a legal investigation (55%), a desire to protect relatives from ajudicial inquiry (52%), and a adequately controlled without the normal psychological functions of the patient being adversely affected." Pieter Admiraal, Justifiable Euthanasia, 3
ISSUES IN L. & MED. 361, 362 (1988).
144. Survey, supra note 3, at 47 (Table 5 .9). 145. Id. at 64 (Table 6 .8). In 68% of the cases the doctor felt that there was no need to consult a colleague because "the situation had been clear." Id. at 65. Before withholding or withdrawing a treatment without request, doctors consulted a colleague in 54% of the cases. Id. at 89 (Table 8.13) . When there was a request, the figure was 43%. Id. at 82 (Table 8.5). Before administering palliative drugs in such doses as might shorten life, doctors consulted a colleague in 47% of the cases. Id. at 73 (Table 7 .4). Muller's survey revealed that, of the doctors consulted, only two thirds talked with the patient, only half studied the medical records, and only 17% physically examined the patient. Muller, supra note 85, at 627.
146. Survey, supra note 3, at 97. 147. Id. at 49 (Table 5 .14). Muller found that in 57% of the cases doctors certified a natural death. Muller, supra note 85, at 628 ( Table 7) . fear of prosecution (25%).148 Similarly, virtually all of the 1,000 acts of life termination without request were certified as natural deaths. The most important reasons given by the doctors were the "fuss" of a legal investigation (47%), the (remarkable) opinion that the death was in fact natural (43%), and the desire to safeguard the relatives from ajudicial inquiry (28%). 149 Interestingly, only 64% of doctors thought that each case of euthanasia should somehow be examined, and the most favored form of review was by other doctors.1 50
III. THE SLIDE IN PRACTICE AND THE SHIFT IN OPINION
My earlier article suggested that the slippery slope argument in both its logical and practical forms applies to the Dutch experience of euthanasia."' The Survey and the Report serve amply to reinforce that contention. The examination of the Guidelines in Part I of this paper concluded that they are vague, loose and incapable of preventing abuse. The Survey bears out this conclusion by indicating that cardinal safeguards -requiring a request which is free and voluntary; well-informed; and durable and persistent -have been widely disregarded. Doctors have killed with impunity. And on a scale previously only guessed at: the Survey discloses that it was the primary purpose of doctors to shorten the lives of over 10,000 patients in 1990, the majority without the patient's explicit request.
How the Remmelink Commission can so confidently conclude, in the light of the evidence unearthed by the Survey, that the "medical actions and decision process concerning the end of life are of high quality" 5 ' is puzzling. The Commission's assessment is based solely on the doctors' uncorroborated replies, 148 . Survey, supra note 3, at 48. The'authors add that 23 doctors actually stated that they had regarded the death as natural.
149. Id. at 65. Deaths hastened by withholding or withdrawing a treatment without request were almost all certified as natural deaths. Id. at 89. All deaths hastened by the administration of palliative drugs also were certified as natural deaths; in over 90% of the cases the doctor felt that the death was natural, but in 9% the doctor felt that reporting an unnatural death would be "troublesome." Id. at 74.
150. Id. at 97 ( Table 9. 3). See also id. at 98. It merits mention that in a small number of cases, the lethal drug was administered by someone other than the doctor, nurse or patient. See id. at 140 (Table 13 .10), 143, 193. 151. Keown, supra note 5. 152. OUTLINE, supra note 23, at 6. Remarkably, van der Maas also regards them of "good quality." Survey, supra note 3, at 199. According to the replies-to Muller's survey, all the safeguard requirements were met in only 41% of the cases. Muller, supra note 85, at 628. Even this figure, based as it is on selfserving replies, may well be too high.
replies which disclose, surely far more reliably, wholesale breaches of the Guidelines. In particular, the scale of intentional life-shortening without explicit request and of illegal certification of death by natural causes must cast grave doubt both on the Commission's conclusion that decision-making is of "high quality" and on van der Maas's opinion that the Survey shows that doctors are "prepared to account for their decisions."15 As the 1,000 cases of unrequested killings vividly illustrate, the existing system cannot realistically hope to detect the doctor who ignores the Guidelines since it essentially relies on him to expose his own wrongdoing.
Moreover, the Remmelink Report's narrow categories of "euthanasia" and "intentional killing without request" may suggest to those who have not considered it before a neat way of side-stepping the reporting procedure. A doctor might kill not by a lethal drug, which he would be required to report, but by an overdose of morphine or by withdrawing treatment, which he could claim with at least some show of legitimacy (in the unlikely event of being challenged) to be "normal medical practice."
Even though recent statistics indicate a significant increase in the number of cases reported (1,424 in 199411) it seems clear that the reporting procedure will continue to provide a wholly inadequate mechanism for regulating euthanasia and that the reports filed will continue to provide no more accurate a picture 153. Survey, supra note 3, at 205. 154. This number is over three times the number for 1990, and it is 120 more than for 1993. 1994 (1995) . The Table also indicates that only 14 cases were. prosecuted in 1993. In a dozen of these cases the prosecution was brought because the patient had not been terminally ill. After the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Chabot (see supra text accompanying note 129) that a terminal illness was not required to justify euthanasia, the prosecution in these cases was discontinued.
of the reality of euthanasia than they have hitherto done. Reports of killing without request promise to be particularly unrepresentative: how many doctors are likely to report a practice which has not (yet) been declared lawful by the courts? 1 55
Further, even if all cases were reported, this would still provide no guarantee of propriety; indeed, were all to be reported, it is doubtful whether prosecutors would have the resources to subject them even to the limited check which reports currently receive.
The Report uses the finding that doctors refused some 4,000 serious requests 156 to argue that "euthanasia" is not used excessively and as an alternative to good palliative care.1 5 7 Leaving aside the evident shortcomings in Dutch terminal care, this is simply illogical, particularly when viewed against the 10,500 occasions on which it was the doctor's primary purpose to shorten life.
That statistic suggests rather the pertinence of the slippery slope argument. The argument's relevance is indeed quite strongly suggested by the fact that doctors had as their primary aim the shortening of the lives of some 5,500 patients without their explicit request (and are represented in the Survey as having had as their subordinate aim the shortening of the lives of upwards of a further 10,000 without their explicit request). The relevance is sufficiently striking even if one focuses simply on the 1,000 cases involving the administration of a lethal drug without explicit request. Nor were these patients killed by a minority of maverick doctors: a majority of doctors admitted that they either had killed without request or would be prepared to do so. ' In any event, it is now evident that some of the leading authorities in the Netherlands openly condone non-voluntary euthanasia in certain circumstances. The Remmelink Report defends, it will be recalled, 159 the vast majority of the 1,000 killings without request as "care for the dying."160 Stating that the absence of a request only serves to make the decision more difficult than when there is a request, it adds:
155. Gevers, supra note 110, at 140. 156. Survey, supra note 3, at 52.
157. OUTLINE, supra note 23, at 2.
158. Survey, supra note 3 at 58 (Table 6 .1). 159. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. 160. A member of the Commission informed me that these killings came as a "terrible shock" to its members, who had hoped that they did not exist. Interview with Mr. A. Kors (Nov. 29, 1991) . This makes the Commission's defense of the bulk of these killings all the more puzzling.
The ultimate justification for the intervention is in both cases the patient's unbearable suffering. So, medically speaking, there is little difference between these situations and euthanasia, because in both cases patients are involved who suffer terribly. The absence of a special request for the termination of life stems partly from the circumstance that the party in question is not (any longer) able to express his will because he is already in the terminal stage, and partly because the demand for an explicit request is not in order when the treatment of pain and symptoms is intensified. The degrading condition the patient is in, confronts the doctor with a case of force majeure. According to the commission, the intervention by the doctor can easily be regarded as an action that is justified by necessity, just like euthanasia.
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The classification of killing without request as "care for the dying" could be criticized as tendentious euphemism and is inconsistent even with established Dutch terminology. 1 62 Moreover, in view of the importance which has long been attached by many Dutch proponents of euthanasia to the need for a request by the patient, it is remarkable that the Commission, rather than setting out a reasoned ethical case to substantiate its opinion that killing without request can be justified, should do scarcely more than assert that a request is no longer essential in all cases.
Nevertheless, the Dutch Parliament has implemented the Commission's recommendation that the reporting procedure for euthanasia should clearly allow for such cases. It has amended the Burial Act of 1955 to set out the reporting procedure in statutory form, a form which makes it clear that the procedure is to be followed even in cases of euthanasia without request. 163 The amendment, which was passed in 1993 and came into force in June 1994, has not made euthanasia lawful but has enshrined the reporting procedure in statutory form.
Similarly, a committee of the K.N.M.G. set up to consider non-voluntary euthanasia has condoned the killing, in certain circumstances, of incompetent patients including babies and patients in persistent coma and has canvassed opinion on the killing of patients with severe dementia. 64 It is surely only a matter of time before such "responsible" medical opinion receives 167 (1992) ; Doen of judicial approval. Indeed, if the criterion for the availability of the defense of necessity is what accords with "responsible" medical opinion, it is difficult to see how the courts could deny it. The authors of the van der Maas Survey, referring to the 1,000 killings without explicit request, state that legally speaking there is no question that these cases should be seen as anything but murder but that "the possibility that a court will accept an appeal to force majeure cannot be ruled out." 1 65 Similarly, Leenen has recently expressed the opinion (which seems to contradict his earlier opinion, 6 6 to which he does not refer) that in "exceptional" cases non-voluntary euthanasia attracts the necessity defense. 16 7 The approval of the courts may not even be necessary: the Chief Prosecutors have already declined to prosecute in a number of cases of killing without request.
One such case involved a patient in a permanent coma after a heart attack. The local Chief Prosecutor, mindful of the Remmelink Commission's recommendation that such cases should be dealt with in the same way as killing on request, decided against prosecution; after questions had been raised in Parliament, his decision was affirmed at a meeting of all the Chief Prosecutors in February 1992.16 Another case concerned a dying, comatose seventy-one year old man who had not asked for his life to be shortened. At a meeting in November 1992 the Chief Prosecutors decided against prosecution since "the action taken ... amounted to virtually the same as suspending ineffectual medical treatment," 169 even though they regarded the case as "potentially extending the boundaries of current practice. Patient, 341 LANCET 1196 , 1199 (1993 (where they write that, when-all the "safeguards" are respected and "only the best interests of the patient are taken into account" such killings are "certainly not murder."). Feb. 12, 1993. 169. Id. 170. Id. A third case involved the killing of a 4 year-old handicapped child who was dying. Charges were dropped "in view of the specific and unusual circumstances of the case, despite the fact that the patient had not
See infra
The current and growing condonation of non-voluntary euthanasia contrasts markedly with earlier pronouncements on euthanasia. There was little support for non-voluntary euthanasia in 1984. As has been seen, the very definition of "euthanasia" adopted by the Dutch incorporated the need for a request. Moreover, the K.N.M.G. Report of that year was careful to confine itself to euthanasia on request and three of its five Guidelines were concerned with ensuring not only that there was a request but that it was free, well-considered and persistent. In 1985, a State Commission on Euthanasia concluded that third parties should not be permitted to request euthanasia on behalf of (incompetent) minors and "other persons incapable of expressing their opinion, such as the mentally handicapped or senile elderly people." 7 ' Its Vice-Chairman, Professor Leenen, has since written that the Commission proposed an amendment to the Penal Code to prohibit the intentional termination of an incompetent patient's life on account of serious physical or mental illness and did so in order to "underline the importance of the request of the patient." 7 ' In 1989, Leenen reaffirmed that a request was "central" to the Dutch definition, adding:
Without it the termination of a life is murder. 'Y 197, 204 (1987 Leenen was echoed in the same year by Henk Rigter, who wrote in the Hastings Center Report "In the absence of a patient request the perpetrator renders him or herself guilty of manslaughter or murder."1 76 An array of leading Dutch advocates of voluntary euthanasia wrote endorsing the accuracy of Rigter's paper, adding that "problems concerning the termination of life of incompetent patients, either comatose or newborn, are not part of the euthanasia problem.' 77 One, the Director of the National Hospital Association, wrote that "euthanasia" meant killing on request, adding:
Consequently, it is impossible for people who do not want euthanasia to be maneuvered or forced into it. The requirement of voluntariness means no one need fear that his or her life is in danger because of age or ill health, and that those who cannot express their will, such as psychogeriatric patients or the mentally-handicapped, shall never be in danger as long as they live.'
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But how much longer will they be allowed to live in view of the common practice of, and growing support for, non-voluntary euthanasia? The argument that euthanasia cannot be forced upon competent or incompetent people, and that such conduct is not part of the euthanasia problem because it does not fall within the definition of "euthanasia" is hardly convincing. If an advocate of abortion were to define abortion as "therapeutic" and dismiss arguments that its legalization might lead to abortion for social reasons, or to women being pressured into abortion, on the ground that they would not be "abortion" and are not, therefore "part of the abortion problem," he or she would rightly be given short shrift. The suggestion, by leading Dutch advocates of euthanasia, that the moral debate about euthanasia can be resolved by definitional fiat serves only to illustrate the intellectual poverty of the case for euthanasia which has come to prevail in their country.
The widespread readiness to kill without any request contrasts starkly with the refusal of many serious requests for euthanasia, and serves further to underline the dispensable role of patient autonomy in the reality, if not the rhetoric, of the Dutch experience. As ten Have and Welie shrewdly point out, accept- 
1995].
ance of euthanasia is not resulting in greater patient autonomy but in doctors "acquiring even more power over the life and death of their patients." 17 9 In 1990 Professor Leenen observed that there is an "almost total lack of control on the administration of euthanasia" in the Netherlands. i "° The Report and the Survey serve only to confirm the accuracy of that observation. 1 ' The Commission sought to paint a reassuring picture of the euthanasia landscape revealed by the Survey, but the scene it depicts is grossly misleading. As Dan Callahan has pointed out, the reality is quite different: "The Dutch situation is a regulatory Potemkin village, a great facade hiding non-enforcement."' 8 2 The hard evidence of the Survey indicates that, within a remarkably short time, the Dutch have proceeded from voluntary to non-voluntary euthanasia. This is partly because of the inability of the vague and loose Guidelines to ensure that euthanasia is only performed in accordance with the criteria laid down by the courts and the KN.M.G. It is also because the underlying justification for euthanasia in the Netherlands appears not to be patient self-determination, but rather acceptance of the principle that certain lives are not "worth" living and that it is right to terminate them. Indeed, the authors of the van der Maas Survey recently lent support to this thesis when they wrote:
[Is] it not true that once one accepts euthanasia and assisted suicide, the principle of universalizability forces one to accept termination of life without explicit request, at least in some circumstances, as well? In our view the answer to this question must be affirmative.' 8 3
Might it not be argued that the number of cases has remained static and that the evidence reveals not a slope but a 181. The author of the Remmelink Report agreed that there was no control over cases which had not been reported and that, even in relation to the reported cases, the prosecutor did not know whether the doctor was telling the truth. He maintained that euthanasia occurred even if the law prohibited it, as was the case outside the Netherlands, and that it was preferable to try to control it. Interview with Mr. A. Kors, Nov. 29, 1991. 182. DANIEL C ,N, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE 115 (1993).
183. See van Delden, supra note 165, at 26 (footnote omitted).
However, the patent reality of the slide in the Netherlands may not yet be fully appreciated outside (or, indeed, inside) that country. The slide was not explicitly identified and criticized by the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, even though a delegation from the Committee visited the Netherlands in October, 1993. Perhaps the delegation was influenced by the statement made to them by a Ministry of Justice spokesman that "the government held strongly to the position that euthanasia was not possible for incompetent patients."186 This statement was made eight months after the proposed change in the law to provide a mechanism for the reporting of non-voluntary euthanasia had been approved by the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament and one month before its approval by the First Chamber. If euthanasia was "not possible" for incompetent patients, why was the government providing for its reporting?
A welcome recognition of the slide is, however, clearly implicit in the Committee's rejection of the legalization of euthanasia, in the light of the Dutch experience, on the ground, inter alia, "that it would not be possible to frame adequate safeguards against non-voluntary euthanasia . . .""' Moreover, in the debate on the motion to receive the Report in the Lords, the Committee's Chairman, Lord Walton, observed that those members of the Committee who had visited the Netherlands returned from the visit "feeling uncomfortable, especially in the light of evidence indicating that non-voluntary euthanasia ... was commonly performed.. ."188 He added that they were "particularly uncomfortable" 8 9 about the case of the woman of 50 suffering from mental stress who had been assisted in suicide by her psychiatrist. His Lordship could, of course, have gone much furtherbut took the view (without saying why) that it would not be proper for him to criticize the decisions of the "medical and legal authorities in another sovereign state."
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Another member of the Committee to comment unfavorably on the Dutch experience, Lord Meston, said:
it did not seem possible to find any other place beyond the existing law for a firm foothold on an otherwise slippery pregnancy involved risk to the life, or to the physical or mental health of the mother, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, or where there was a substantial risk that if the child were born it would be seriously handicapped. Of course, the reality of the slippery slope may not have been lost on at least some Dutch advocates of voluntary euthanasia, who may have thought it tactically desirable to maintain a discreet silence about it. Professor Alexander Capron, reporting on a euthanasia conference in the Netherlands at which this point was conceded, has written that the Dutch proponents of euthanasia began with a narrow definition of euthanasia "as a strategy for winning acceptance of the general practice, which would then turn to . . . relief of suffering as its justification in cases in which patients are unable to request euthanasia." 1 9
He adds: "It was an instance, or so it seemed to me, when the candour of our hosts was a little chilling." 1 93
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper began by asking if the Dutch experience shows that acceptance of voluntary euthanasia does not lead to acceptance of euthanasia without request. The evidence presented, which is consistent with evidence unearthed by a number of other commentators on the Dutch experience, 1 94 suggests the contrary. Those who thought that euthanasia could and would be confined to the lucid, rational patient who makes a free and informed decision to be killed because he or she is terminally ill 191. Id. at 1398. In a recent decision of the Canadian Supreme Court rejecting an alleged right to assisted suicide in Canadian law, Mr. Justice Sopinka, delivering the majority judgment, noted the "worrisome trend" in the Netherlands toward euthanasia without request, which supported the view that "a relaxation of the absolute prohibition takes us down the 'slippery slope.'" Rodriguez v. Attorney-General, 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 403 (1994 (1992) . and suffering unbearable pain beyond alleviation by the best palliative care available, have been shown to be quite mistaken. The Dutch experience lends weighty support to the slippery slope argument in both its forms. Within no more than a decade, the so-called "strict" safeguards against the slide have proved signally ineffectual; non-voluntary euthanasia is now widely practiced and increasingly condoned in the Netherlands. For inhabitants of such a flat country, the Dutch have indeed proved remarkably fast skiers.
